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• NTSB
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Some folks are not as
enthusiastic about marine electronics as I am. Thus I get the occasional
letter that goes something like this, “Now you listen up, sonny;
back when we all knew how to get around with just a paper chart and a
compass, we were better navigators. Those gizmos get people in trouble!”
Do electronics sometimes lead to problems? Absolutely yes, but you’d
better examine the details before you jump to conclusions.
Thus it’s useful
that some nautical accidents are examined in astonishing detail. While
not commonly done in the world of recreational boating, the commercial
shipping authorities analyze mistakes with almost fetishistic intensity.
The results are commonly called maritime casualty reports, and while they
may sound a bit ghoulish, many professional mariners read them with the
optimistic goal of learning from the mistakes of others. In fact, every
issue of the fine magazine Professional Mariner includes extracts
of current casualty reports.
We can learn, too, and
these days many agencies like the U.K.’s Marine Accident Investigation
Branch (MAIB) make its full reports conveniently available on the Web.
That’s where I found an investigation of a collision in the English
Channel that vividly illustrates some realities of modern radar usage.
The 58-page report, published as an illustrated PDF file, describes every
aspect of the incident, including each vessel’s equipment and crew,
and then draws conclusions and makes recommendations. Though the writing
style is “just the facts, ma’am” Sergeant Friday flat,
it’s a compelling read.
The 47-foot British
sailing yacht Wahkuna set off from France toward home one clear
morning in May 2003, but soon found herself motoring in thick fog. The
owner, who had 40 years’ recreational experience and Royal Yachting
Association certificates of competency, was at the helm, which was equipped
with a top-of-the-line Raymarine R70 radar. Four quite experienced crew
were in the cockpit with him. At around 10:45 a large target appeared
about six miles off the starboard bow. The illustrations on page 40 show
each vessel’s track and how Wahkuna’s radar might have
looked if the target echo was perfectly “trailed” for 15 minutes.
Actually, the Raymarine
had features well beyond echo trails, like a Mini Automatic Radar Plotting
Aid (MARPA) function, which might have plotted the target vessel’s
true speed and course, and the all-important Closest Point of Approach
(CPA). Wahkuna also had a R80 radar down below at the nav station that
one of the crew might have been working simultaneously. “However,”
MAIB notes, “during the events leading to the accident, only the
display in the cockpit area was being monitored, and…neither the
skipper nor the crew fully understood, or appreciated, the information
that could have been provided by the equipment.”
Meanwhile, the captain
of the 908-foot container ship Nedlloyd Vespucci, who had just
jogged slightly right for another target, had his Atlas ARPA radar plotting
Wahkuna and had determined that she would cross his track almost a mile
ahead. This man had 20 years of professional training and service, including
three as master of this particular vessel type, and was so conscientious
about the Channel run that he’d been on the bridge for 14 hours.
He maintained his 25-knot speed.
Next page >
Part 2: A mere 15 minutes after
the incident began, Wahkuna’s crew saw a wall of steel emerge
from the fog. > Page 1, 2,
3, 4, 5,
6, 7
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